Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27 : CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

Central Intelligence Agency



DDI-10229185

0 3 MAY 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

National Security Council

SUBJECT:

Draft NSDD on Pacific Basin

- 1. The NSC has asked for CIA concurrence on the subject draft NSDD on the Pacific Basin. We do not concur at this time, believing that the NSDD should first be improved in clarity and purpose. Our reasons:
- The proposed NSDD is unclear as to what exactly the Pacific Basin is, or should be conceptualized as. There is much rhetoric concerning the Pacific Basin that is highly positive, but the concept means different things to different actors. There is considerable disagreement as to what the Pacific Basin includes. The ASEAN countries focus on themselves plus the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Others believe Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong should be included. Another view includes Mexico and other parts of Latin America. The draft NSDD tends to leave these questions hanging.
- There are possible negative, as well as positive, aspects of the Pacific Basin idea which the NSDD should mention. The NSDD's assumption that "trends and developments are in the overall interest of the United States and further our foreign policy objectives" overlooks the possibility that some of the actors involved now see Pacific Basin cooperation principally as a means to expand exports to the US, which has the potential to increase the US trade deficit.
- There is a possibility that under the rubric of Pacific Basin cooperation the spread of anti-nuclear sentiment could be encouraged. There is evidence that New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies are gaining credibility among some of the Pacific Island states. Indonesia has also been supporting the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone as a first step towards the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.

CL BY SIGNER DECL OADR

DOI NO

- There is a possibility that cultural, religious, and other basic forces could promote disruptive nationalistic influences in the Pacific. US efforts to enhance cooperation, even if limited and focused on nonofficial areas, probably will be interpreted by some groups as intervention, possibly leading to intensified anti-US feeling, and potential Soviet gains. The proposed NSDD needs to consider how such eventualities should be dealt with.
- The NSDD should be clear about just what mix of US private and government involvement is envisaged. The proposed NSDD needs to be more precise on what degree of government involvement is envisioned in supporting the private sector, on how this might affect US security interests, and on what the US could do if its economic interests are threatened by increasing multilateralism. The present proposal focuses on encouraging the private sector while "not seeking at this stage to create formal governmental structures." Yet it also says that "agendas and membership of any multilateral forum must be carefully examined and managed." These two goals are not compatible.
- 2. In withholding concurrence at this time we are not fighting the idea of a Pacific Basin. We do feel strongly, however, that the USG not embark on this journey until the NSDD has pointed out more clearly what the name of the voyage is, and just where the <u>USG wishes it to qo.</u>

Executive Secretary

25X1

25X1

DCI/NIC/ActingNIO/EA

DISTRIBUTION:

Orig - Addressee

- 1 EX REG
- 1 EX SEC
- 1 C/NIC
- 1 VC/NIC
- 1 DDI REG
- 1 NIO/EA
- 1 NIO/SUBJ

2 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27 : CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

### **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP**

TO:	Г	<u> </u>	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1	DCI	:	Х		
	2	DDCI		Х		
	3	EXDIR		X		
	4	D/IC\$				
	5	DDI		Х		
	6	DDA				
	7	DDO		Х		
	8	DDS&T				
	9	Chm/NIC				
	10	GC				
	11	IG				
	12	Compt				
	13	D/Pers				
	14	D/OLL				
	15	D/PAO			,	
	16	SA/IA				
	1 <i>7</i>	AO/DCI				
	18	C/IPD/OIS				
	19	NIO/EA		Х		
	20	VC/NIC	X			
	21	OEA/DI	,	Х		
[	22	C/EA/DO		Х		
	$oldsymbol{arOmega}$	SUSPENSE COB, 2 May 85  Date				

Remarks 23. NIO/ECON

Х

To # 20: Please prepare comments/concurrence for my signature.

3637 (10-81)

25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

ことに

VIA LDX

SYSTEM II 90226 Add-on

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1985

**Executive Registry** 

911/1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs Office of the Vice President

> MR. NICHOLAS PLATT **Executive Secretary** Department of State

MR. EDWARD J. STUCKY Acting Executive Secretary Department of the Treasury

COLONEL R. J. APPOURTIT Executive Secretary Department of Defense

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS Executive Assistant to the Secretary Department of Commerce

**Executive Secretary** Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT:

Proposed NSDD on Pacific Basin Cooperation for Clearance

Attached is a proposed NSDD on Pacific Basin Cooperation previously coordinated by the State Department to interested agencies. formal concurrence be provided to the NSC by May 3, 1985.

Robert Kumith

Robert M. Kimmitt **Executive Secretary** 

Attachment

Tab A Proposed NSDD on Pacific Basin Cooperation

DCI EXEC

25X1

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

TAB A

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

OCUKE

THE WHITE HOUSE

SYSTEM II 90226

SECRET

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER

# PACIFIC BASIN COOPERATION (U)

#### BACKGROUND

The United States recognizes the importance of its growing relationships with other Pacific nations to its overall economic, political and security interests. As a Pacific nation itself, the United States seeks, at many levels, to strengthen and coordinate its interactions with other regional countries. This interest in greater regional cooperation is shared by many of the Pacific nations. Continued cooperation and maintenance of open, competitive markets in the area will reduce trade friction, increase economic growth, and foster stronger overall relationships. (U)

While seeking to foster and broaden the regional cooperative process, the United States must maintain and strengthen its key bilateral relationships in the Pacific. (U)

Within the region, various private groups and organizations have been established, chiefly in the commercial and professional sectors, to promote better ties among the peoples and nations of the Pacific. In addition, the six (6) ASEAN nations have initiated periodic dialogues on economic issues with the five (5) advanced economies of the region (Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Within this 6+5 framework, joint effort already has begun on human resources development activities. There is a growing potential for further multilateral cooperation among the ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners in this and other economic fields. (C)

These trends and developments are in the overall interest of the United States and further our foreign policy objectives. The United States should not seek to force the pace or dominate the developments, but should encourage and support evolutionary steps forward, utilizing existing mechanisms and organizations. We must anticipate Soviet efforts to disrupt or slow progress; and we must reassure our European allies of our continuing commitment to their security and mutual economic cooperation. (S)

SECRET

SFCRFT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27 : CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1

SECRET

## **GOALS**

The focus of our efforts at this stage should be on encouraging activities by the private sector and by non-governmental organizations. We are not seeking at this stage to create formal governmental structures. And, above all, we must seek to avoid the appearance of a dominant United States role. development will be successful only to the extent that it is built on the initiative and interest of all the countries of the region. (S)

Accordingly, United States policy should facilitate and reinforce existing private sector activities. . A range of private sector, academic and governmental organizations will serve to enlist broad participation as we move toward more formalized cooperative activities.

United States policy should build on existing institutions and mechanisms to foster stronger and deeper regional multilateral relationships, and seek, as circumstances permit, to expand involvement in the 6+5 by other governments, as observers or participants; to involve non-governmental entities, such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and the Pacific Science Association, with governments drawing on these entities as resources on a range of specialized issues; and to use the 6+5 forum (as expanded) as one of the means to address significant regional economic issues relating to trade and capital investment.

The United States policy should seek open trading markets in both directions, and be prepared to address domestic protectionist pressure.

Multilateral efforts must be managed in such a way that they do not disrupt vitally important bilateral relationships or encourage the proliferation of problems like our present dispute over ship access in New Zealand. For this reason, agendas and membership of any multilateral forum must be carefully examined and managed. **(S)** 

## IMPLEMENTATION

To ensure that United States interests are represented in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Executive Branch officials should participate actively (in a non-official capacity) in the United States National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation and should work to broaden participation in private sector fora by the major economic actors in the Pacific, such as the ASEAN countries, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and China; and to identify practical multilateral cooperative steps, especially in the areas of trade and finance, which do not undercut established United States bilateral objectives.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R002303770006-1 DECKEI

SECRET

The Interagency Group on the Pacific, chaired by the Department of State, shall continue to coordinate government activities with regard to Pacific Basin initiatives, specifically those dealing with the ASEAN 6+5 (as its agenda evolves), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and similar Pacific Basin private sector cooperative groups; and to develop and recommend programs to improve the awareness and understanding by Americans of the importance of the Pacific, including the creation or expansion of educational programs, student exchange and other programs which foster greater familiarity and understanding among the American public of the Pacific, and increase training in Pacific languages and culture.

Sanitized Copy Approved for R	elease 2009/11/27 : CIA-RDP87M00	539R002303770006-1	
No 215	THE WHITE H	OUSE	App 29 (U 13 PH '85
MESSAGE NO. 9	70 CLASSIFICATION	SECRET	PAGES 6
FROM ROBERT KINNEY	<u> </u>	456-2224 (EXTENSION)	(ROOM NUMBER)
(NAME)		•	•
MESSAGE DESCRIPT (S)	ION PROPOSED NSDD ON PAC		SYSTEM II 90226 ADD-0
TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM	NO. EXTENSION
"B"	NICHOLAS PLATT	EXEC SEC D	EPT OF STATE
- "K1"	MR. EDWARD J. STUCKY	ACTING EXE	C SEC DEPT TREASURY
"D"	COL R.J. AFFOURTIT	EXEC SEC D	EPT OF DEF.
"L"	MRS. HELEN ROBBINS	EXEC ASSIS	T-SEC DEPT OF COMMERC
*A*	MR. JOHN H. RIXSE 7. 582	exec sec c	EN INTEL AGENCY
	•		
		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
REMARKS			
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		i a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	in Carlos and the Car